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Climate change research has faced increased public scrutiny over the last several years. The scientific consensus 
on anthropogenic climate change has significant public policy implications, and this, combined with the 
resulting public scrutiny, has had material consequence to how science in this field is done. Dissenting 
research, as well as dissent more generally, is often made in a way that is damaging to the pursuit of 
knowledge, instead of beneficial to it. 
views are created and spread, establishing strict criteria for these without implicating the normal dissent that is 
so crucial to scientific practice, remains difficult. After discussing the background of EDD in existing 
philosophical literature, an alternative  the communications account of epistemically detrimental dissent  is 
proposed. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
Scientific research on anthropogenic climate change has faced increasing public scrutiny over 
the last several decades. What began as an observation on the chemical properties of carbon dioxide 
in the atmosphere rapidly evolved into scientists coming to increased certainty over a worrying trend: 
not only are average global temperatures rising annually, they are doing so as a result of human 
activity (Held and Soden 2006). 
The policy ramifications of climate science have had several pertinent consequences for the 
study itself. For instance, there is quite a bit of emphasis on consensus in the field of climate science 
(E. Winsberg 2018), and as a result, those that participate in it err overly to the side of 
conservativism both when it comes to constructing models for research, and when it comes to 
reporting the data generated from these (Brysse, et al. 2012) (Hansen 2007). This is because 
anthropogenic climate change has deeply significant economic implications, due to the measures that 
must be taken to limit its effects. Fossil fuel combustion is one of the leading causes of carbon 
dioxide emissions globally, and policies designed to reduce consumption of these fuels pose a very 
real threat to the financial viability of the companies that produce these.  
As a result, climate research has been subject to dissenting views that are unlike the sort 
usually seen, particularly when compared areas of science that are further removed from political 
implications.  While criticism is a normal part of science, much of what we see in climate science 
goes well beyond the norm, in a way that has been shown as harmful to research endeavours. As well 
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as erring on the side of conservatism (Rolin 2017), this dissent has made researchers hesitant to 
publish their findings (Biddle and Leuschner 2015) due to fear of public backlash. More and more, 
we are beginning to see the pressure from this dissent dictate and direct not just the topics and 
methods of inquiry chosen by scientists, but what they publish, and by extension, what is accepted as 
fact. So not only is this dissent abnormal, it is having a material damaging effect on climate science 
as an epistemic pursuit. 
This essay considers where, how, and why some of this criticism deviates so far from the 
norm in science. In doing so, it joins the efforts of others, most notably Biddle and Leuschner, in 
attempting to demarcate between this kind of dissent and others, which, as mentioned, are a normal 
and important part of scientific research. Without this effort, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, 
to call out the bad actors perpetuating this damage, and limits our ability to mitigate its effect in the 
future.  
It will begin by providing the philosophical background that these issues are rooted in, 
particularly, values and inductive reasoning in science. Then, it will describe other perspectives on 
dissent in science, and scientific norms. Then it will introduce a case example to show the confluence 
of factors that can be used to describe what will be called epistemically detrimental dissent. Wider 
concerns about the implications of this will be discussed. 
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2.0 Values, Disputes, Controversies 
 
Before discussing cases of epistemically detrimental dissent, it would be useful to begin by defining 
some key terms.  Despite most of the literature on dissent being written from a shared philosophical 
perspective, the use of central terminology varies quite often, making a disambiguation of the terms 
worthwhile. 
2.1 Values 
A value, as used in philosophy of science literature, is an attitude or belief that directs, 
dictates, or defines the priorities of a scientist (Rudner 1953).  Epistemic values are values that 
dictate, define and guide (decisions that are made in) the production of knowledge. They allow us to 
(Douglas, The Value of 
Cognitive Values 2013, p.80). In other words, they give us epistemic assurance, which allows us to 
hold and test our best theories in a reliable manner. Epistemic values, also sometimes called cognitive 
values, include explanatory power, empirical adequacy and internal consistency; a theory has to 
explain a phenomenon, as well as agree with itself and agree with the data in some measurable way. 
Internal consistency of a theory is the least controversial epistemic value. It demands that a theory is 
logically sound according to the principles it establishes. Empirical adequacy, sometimes called 
empirical success, is the demand that a theory have enough evidence to support the claims that it 
makes. The value of explanatory power is that a theory should account well for phenomena it is 
attempting to describe, and account better than preceding theories. 
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Other values such as simplicity, fruitfulness, and scope of applicability are also often included 
in this category, (Lacey, 1995) but they are better grouped under constitutive values for reasons I will 
explain.  
Constitutive values 
(Longino 1990, p.4) and these would contain within them a) 
epistemic values, such as those listed above, as well as b) other values, such as simplicity. In other 
words, epistemic values are a necessary subset of constitutive values. Constitutive values acknowledge 
the desires of researchers in the context of knowledge-
considered epistemic values proper. For instance, a simpler theory is preferable to its less simple 
alternative ceteris paribus, because that makes it easier for scientists to use and share. The simplicity 
does not itself make the theory any more likely to be true. Epistemic values are identified as such 
because the most important characteristic of a scientific theory is that it is epistemically good, sound, 
or proper. Conte
accessibility of researchers, they are less prioritised, and therefore more flexible in their use. A theory 
that sacrifices scope of applicability can be redeemed in other ways, but a theory that sacrifices 
internal consistency absolutely cannot.  
Contextual values are sometimes referred to as non-epistemic or non-cognitive values. 
These are values that are of a personal, social or cultural nature that guide scientific research and can 
include, for example, the wish to avoid harm to human populations in risk assessment (Wandall 
2004).  While this is a specific example of a contextual value that is regarded as valid and acceptable 
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to have present in scientific research, the kind of values that are called out as inappropriate most 
often fall under this category. 
  The value free ideal, then, refers to the common belief that science should not allow for the 
ethical values [can] help to direct the particular projects scientists undertake,
are made in the context of justification should not include any kind of value motivation whatsoever 
(Douglas 2009, p.45). This ideal fundamentally rests on conceiving of science as something that is 
done in isolation from wider society, rejecting the idea that the internal standards of science should 
take broader societal problems into consideration at all. The reasoning behind supporting this view is 
the idea that knowledge is a descriptive enterprise, while values are normative, making attempts to 
reconcile the two misguided. This view was pervasive in the philosophy of science until the 1980s. 
 Elliott and Richards describe in detail the origins of this view, along with the noted 
individuals that still defend it (Elliott and Richards 2017). While the more popular view is to reject 
the value free ideal, these individuals argue that the value free ideal can be maintained through 
avoiding altogether the argument from inductive risk. 
 
2.2 Disputes  
Scientific disputes occur when researchers disagree about a given evidentiary conclusion, and 
are a core and even necessary feature of any progressing scientific field. They have happened over 
theory and hypothesis acceptance, or lack thereof. In more concrete terms, they occur over scientists 
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who believe a theory is strong enough or good enough to use as a foundation for their work, as 
opposed to scientists who either do not believe this, or believe that an alternate competing 
hypothesis is better. These theories are often not just related to the external subjects of the field, they 
can also relate to internal practices, such as disputes over whether a given instrument is adequate for 
its purported use (Kitcher, Patterns of Scientific Controversies 2000). When a technical dispute 
arises, it can call attention to problems in the presently accepted literature. Researching around these 
problems can help scientists to develop a more concrete understanding of their object of study, as 
objections call attention to areas that have been taken for granted, or not sufficiently considered. 
 
2.3 Controversies 
A scientific controversy, however, has come to mean significantly more than a dispute. 
Controversies have been well documented by historians of science, (Oreskes and Conway 2010) and 
are, in essence, disputes that have been extended over time (Engelhardt and Caplan 1987). Where 
disputes have a feedback effect that can be epistemic and therefore positive in nature, controversies, 
per Winsberg, create a non-epistemic and therefore destructive effect on the scientific enterprise. (E. 
B. Winsberg 2018).  
 
3.0 Current Philosophical Views on Dissent 
One of the main perspectives on dissent in the current literature is the Inductive Risk 
Account of Epistemically Detrimental Dissent. It describes four criteria that are meant to be 
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jointly sufficient for identifying the kind of epistemic dissent that is 
 
(Biddle and Leuschner 2015). This dynamic  both the lack of progress, and the consequential 
impediment of progress  is one that I also believe is central to understanding EDD. I am labelling it 
vacillation  
Epistemic vacillation takes the idea of transformative criticism that was first introduced in 
Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in 
Scientific Inquiry. Given that has been identified as 
a vital part of the objective scientific process, then focusing on its opposite allows us to identify 
-essential, and indeed damaging to that process. The opposite, therefore, is something 
that when fully engaged and explored, advances no novel understanding of the field. This 
describes the first important aspect of vacillation  normally, when an idea fails to contribute in this 
way, attention moves away from it, onto other ideas that may better aid our understanding of the 
target of investigation. We begin to see vacillation , and 
instead of pursuing new ventures, scientists go back to those same topics repeatedly due to factors 
that are outside of their control. 
This has a crucial secondary effect: though going back to well understood topics does not 
destroy the existing understanding that scientists have worked to build, preventing their exploration 
of new ideas is detrimental, because it limits the combined efforts that we would have seen to 
advance understanding of it. To wit, the end result of epistemic vacillation is stalling scientific 
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make about the subject, whether it aligns with the consensus position or not. 
Biddle and Leuschner therefore believe that EDD operates via this mechanism of vacillation. 
 by them, I believe that epistemic vacillation acts as a precursor 
necessary condition, from which point their four named criteria begin to apply. 
 Justin Biddle and Anna Leuschner outline criteria that allow us to identify when scientific 
dissent or controversy is epistemically detrimental. According to them, 
Dissent from a hypothesis H is epistemically detrimental if each of the following obtains:  
1) The non-epistemic consequences of wrongly rejecting H are likely to be severe. 
2) The dissenting research that constitutes the objection violates established conventional standards  
3) The dissenting research involves intolerance for the risk of accepting H. 
4) The risks of accepting H and being wrong and the risk of rejecting H and being wrong fall 
largely upon different parties.  
dissent (Biddle and Leuschner 2015), we need to review the role of inductive risk in our 
understanding of values in science.  
The argument from inductive risk  otherwise called the error argument  describes a type of 
epistemic risk (J. B. Biddle 2018) that is involved in theory and hypothesis appraisal when they are 
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influenced by social values (Elliott and Richards 2017). The preoccupation with the influence of 
values on the scientific process began to be raised in 1953, with  
 (Rudner 1953). It was revived and revised by 
Heather Douglas (Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal 2009) at the start of this century. 
the inductive reasoning used in all sciences, there must be something that arbitrates the evaluation of 
evidence as sufficient or insufficient for accepting a hypothesis. This rests on the idea that there will 
always be limited or finite evidence for a theory, and so there must be a collective standard for 
acceptable evidence thresholds when assessing different theories. Understanding that there are two 
different types of error (false positives and false negatives,) and understanding that these standards of 
evidence can vary based on our perception of the possible errors, the crux of this argument rests 
upon the idea that the evidence standards ought to be chosen in consideration of social, moral, and 
ethical values (ChoGlueck 2018).   
As a consequence of the Rudnerian thesis, one must accept that social values exist within the 
scientific process. This is where the inductive risk account gets its name  the acceptance or rejection 
of hypotheses based on how willing we are to be wrong can, first, depend on our values. So, 
epistemically risky inductions are mediated by social values. 
  Heather Douglas expands the original claim to say that value judgements of the sort that 
Rudner detailed actually take place throughout the entire scientific process. Any sort of a decision 
made during research depends on our values. Instead of the inductive risk being focused only at the 
 
 
10 
 
end point, science is a series of value judgements, each coming with their own inductive risk and 
requiring some input from social values.  
Many philosophers that reject the strong value-free ideal of science, Biddle & Leuschner 
included, accept this modified claim. Because they have adopted this idea, Douglas, Biddle and 
Leuschner aim to set out ideas about the correct and proper use of these values in science. Despite 
their rejection of the value-free ideal of science, they believe that there is a right way to do good 
science, and that this is something that happens in fact  even with the inclusion of values.  
Douglas outlines the role of values and their proper place in science from a normative 
perspective, differentiating between direct and indirect roles, proper to epistemic and non-epistemic 
values, respectively. Whereas indirect values influence the kind of evidence standards that are 
appropriate for given circumstances, direct values are values which are used in considering how 
worthy a given theory or knowledge claim is (Elliott 2011, p.304). We can identify improper 
procedure.  A similar idea can be seen from Phillip Kitcher, who introduced the concept of grubby 
and depraved motivations of scientists in Science Without Legend in 1993. 
These all capture a general theme: although values are pervasive within the scientific process, 
there must be rules as to when they can be manifest in the work, by whom, and under what capacity. 
This is one of the main things that keeps science understood as something that can be counted on to 
produce reliable knowledge. . 
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4.0 Inductive Risk Account of Epistemically Detrimental Dissent  
Let  return more closely to the Inductive Risk Account of Epistemically Detrimental 
Dissent (IRAEDD). Recall that Biddle and Leuschner begin by asserting that 
1) The non-epistemic consequences of wrongly rejecting H are likely to be severe. 
They start with this criteria because, as is demonstrated in the paper, widely held social values 
manifested through political pressures can be one of the largest forces behind EDD. Politics only 
gets involved when there are some sort of non-epistemic consequences at play, such as the ecological 
disaster that will obtain due to climate change. 
draws the vested self-interests of people outside of the scientific community focused on studying that 
topic is susceptible to EDD under this rule. 
Here, we can say that something has non-epistemic consequences if its intimate effects are 
not merely limited to the body-knowledge. These kind of pressures have the potential to change the 
natural distribution of labour that would normally exist in a scientific field for the worse via a) 
researcher intimidation and b) the creation of busywork (p.10) and this criterion was designed to 
capture those social epistemic changes that directly obtain due to political pressure. Hence, a 
researcher should choose the direction of her research based on epistemic considerations, like that she 
believes a particular avenue to be the most intellectually engaging, or most promising for explanatory 
power, rather than any external pressures that would compel her to do something different. 
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 Next, Biddle and Leuschner state, 
2) The dissenting research that constitutes the objection violates established conventional standards 
This seeks to capture the idea that the detrimental dissenting research is in itself qualitatively 
 (2015).   Repeating this sort of research is what makes the creation of busywork 
to the established orthodoxy, so responding to them is not epistemically fruitful but, in fact, a waste 
of time, capturing the notion of epistemic vacillation also discussed previously.  
The latter two criteria, 
3) The dissenting research involves intolerance for the risk of accepting H,  
and 
4) The risks of accepting H and being wrong and the risk of rejecting H and being wrong fall 
largely upon different parties  
entail each other to an extent. They want to capture the idea that, because the interested party has 
some stake in the outcome, they will manufacture circumstances so that the structure of the 
experiment itself makes the less desirable outcome less likely. Together they provide the concept that 
they are doing it because they or the individuals they represent have something to gain, while 4 
demonstrates that, in addition to this, they have nothing to lose. 
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To summarise, Biddle & Leuschner want to show that when given research is mired in political 
dispute, of poor quality, and with experiments rigged to diminish producer risk, it is epistemically 
detrimental dissenting research. 
4.1 Feedback and Criticism for the Inductive Risk Account 
sufficient 
criteria that are only jointly sufficient
political pressures that make up their first condition. That is to say, while it may be more probable 
you will find instances of EDD in areas of science that have demonstrable non-epistemic 
consequences, focusing on these consequences may make us overlook EDD in areas that have none, 
or similarly, wrongly m Additionally, it 
would seem like wrongly accepting H must also have some significant consequence for the effects of 
the dissent to obtain. That is to say, the reason that there is a controversy is that people (legitimately 
or otherwise) fear what might happen if we accept climate change, and in doing so, pass legislature 
that would do irreparable damage to the economy. So, at the very least, this criterion must read  
The non-epistemic consequences of wrongly rejecting or accepting H are likely to be severe.   
sufficient conditions criteria set. While many of our paradigm 
examples of EDD come from the field of climate science, where the consequences affect everybody 
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inhabiting planet Earth, there are many ways in which political disputes of this sort could obtain 
without severely affecting the lives of anyone outside of a fringe minority. To put a slight twist on a 
historical example, we might look to big bang theorists vs creationists. 
One of the most hotly disputed scientific claims in existence is the one that places the age of 
the Earth at approximately 4,500,000,000 years. This is at odds with the claims of the Bible, which 
places the age of the Earth at several thousand years. The palaeontologists and the Christians were 
using entirely different epistemic values to assess the evidence they each presented, and so the dispute 
persists to a controversy. The way that this incident ended up happening meant that the controversy 
played out very differently compared to the one we have seen regarding climate science. The 
epistemic standards of the Christians who publicly denounced these areas of science were viewed as 
opinions that had no bearing on the standards used by the scientists themselves. So while there were 
definite effects on policy  many school districts voted not to teach this science to students  the 
public arena did not change the manner that scientists conducted their research. While the epistemic 
state of science was not changed because of this public controversy, the state in climate science very 
much has been. 
Despite the two episodes being somewhat different in nature, it is more than feasible that a 
devout fundamental Christian with millions of dollars on hand would have personally set out to 
fund research that would prove the consensus scientific view on the age of the earth to be wrong, as 
lobbyists successfully did with tobacco and climate science (Oreskes and Conway 2010). Wrongly 
rejecting or accepting this hypothesis may have some epistemic consequences, but generally 
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speaking, it 
rejected or not. People taking the science seriously, in his view, risk eternal damnation  that being 
the ultimate consequence.  
This example illustrates that the ambiguity 
unnecessarily misdirect people seeking to identify EDD. Avoiding this is important; while some 
believe that EDD can only obtain in areas of science that have policy implications, I believe that 
EDD can occur anywhere there is a vested, non-epistemic interest in the research at hand. This 
could mean something as trivial as research behind the mating habits of spiders, so long as there is at 
least one interested party at hand. 
I have taken to mean something along the lines of life-altering enough to will an 
individual to take significant action, making it worth bringing the creationist example forward. That 
play out with countervailing research thought of as equally legitimate, 
attempting to capture. So I think my case shows that the first criterion would even better read:  
1*)  The non-epistemic consequences of wrongly rejecting or accepting H are likely to be severe to some 
interested, powerful, influential party.  
Where powerful indicates possession or command of resources that would let the social 
epistemic landscape of a field be altered. 
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Turning to the second criterion, Winsberg 
understood implicitly, there is no conventional set of standards that is detailed enough to resolutely 
decide if a given research paper has broken these standards, or adhered to them (E. B. Winsberg 
2018). Second, closely related to the first - 
not the standards have been adhered to in any given research paper, due to the technical difficulties 
and limitations that go into the assessment of experimental procedures themselves. Briefly, this lack 
of clarity leads to assessments having to be made about whether some research has adhered to the 
conventional standards enough
uniformly.  
He supports the inclusion of a sufficient condition advanced by Phillip Kitcher that would 
  
-
epistemic goals as well as epistemic ones  the desire for new, legitimate knowledge, for example 
(Kitcher 2011).  Arguments like these are closely related to the discourse of values that is so primary 
in this discussion. Contextual values playing a role in science means that the direction of any given 
research can depend, at least in part, on the natural dispositions, attitudes, and motivations of a 
  scientists who are 
motivated to do good science, and to get famous for it, vs scientists that are only interested in getting 
famous (2011). It is also why Biddle & Leuschner include criteria relating to the non-epistemic 
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consequences of rejecting hypotheses or the different risks that fall on different parties. The idea is 
the nature of her dissent, like whether or not it is detrimental. 
While there is often concern expressed about the ability of outside observers to access the 
(de Melo Martín and Intemann 2018), this risks 
distracting from the issue of whether or not the initial assumption is true  that there is a need to 
know her disposition at all. At the least, an account like this risks excluding the well-intentioned 
actor whose stances nevertheless cause epistemic vacillation. Take, for instance, a climate sceptic who 
genuinely believes for whatever reason, that the existing research in climate change is ambiguous. 
The sceptic vacillation, which in turn allows EDD to occur. 
Furthermore, it is worth wondering whether the equivocation between depraved motivation in 
based in contextual values, is made too hastily here. Our contextual 
values also address aspects of research that are regarded as positive, like research ethics, so forming an 
account of EDD that depends on motives may risk inadvertently implicating these.  
Furthermore, despite there often being technological limitations on the feasibility of 
understanding some violations, I would nevertheless argue that while defining explicitly the 
conventional standards at work in any scientific field can be difficult, identifying when they are 
violated is in fact easy, because of their general uniformity within fields of research. Much of the 
literature describes science as a process where these standards (or, shared values) are constantly in 
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play, e.g. (Longino 1990); (Kitcher, Patterns of Scientific Controversies 2000) so that they 
constantly , despite often being unspecified or unspoken. 
4.2 Place and Time of the Motivations Account and its Criticisms 
 IRAEDD, and others of its kind, are largely founded upon something I will call the 
o have access to her 
attitudes and desires as they relate to her work. The mindset of individual scientists is something that 
is appealed to or alluded to in making claims about types of dissent, e.g. (de Melo Martín and 
Intemann 2018, p.33-34) grubby and 
depraved researchers  terms used to describe when a scientist is motivated by epistemic and selfish 
ends, as opposed to selfish ends only (Kitcher 1993). Successfully making a claim about the 
motivation of a scientist would therefore be the key sufficient criterion needed to identify cases of 
EDD. Responses to this are varied. Some say that it is a worthless pursuit from the onset, as it 
depends on -  (Lloyd and Winsberg 2018). Others 
say that attempting to single out certain types of dissent is something we ought not to pursue as it 
risks discouraging legitimate dissent, and is not necessary for the goal of creating sound public policy 
(de Melo Martín and Intemann 2018) 
Heather Douglas says that we ought to keep track of how individual scientists have 
historically weighed evidence, in order to see whether or not our contextual values (and therefore 
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tendencies in weighing evidence) align. This can help us consider to what extent we agree with a 
(Douglas 2015). 
 On a related view, Winsberg is unconvinced by the claims of Biddle and Leuschner that we 
cannot know the motivations of organisations and individuals, and instead argues that these can be 
istorical records, communications, funding sources, and 
does not make explicit one of the more important aspects of the idea: we can establish depraved 
intent by the absence of a thing, namely, of meaningful response to critique, or of meaningful 
evolution of an original viewpoint. This is no better exemplified by a case in 2011 with two 
researchers that published and publicised epistemically detrimental dissenting research: John Christy 
and David Douglass.  
John Christy and David Douglass were two scientists whose climate research using data from 
radiosondes (Douglass, et al. 2008) was discredited almost immediately by several climate scientists. 
As told by Lloyd and Winsberg (2018), 
University  of  Alabama,  Hunstville, testified to a Congressional Committee that global 
climate models  were  contradicted  and  undermined  by  those  data,  and  that  global 
warming and the greenhouse effect were not occurring, contrary to  what  the  models  said.  
He  placed  a  published  paper  into  the  Congressional Record to support these claims: 
Douglass et al. (2008). This paper had been thoroughly discredited in the scientific literature 
by other climate scientists, including those who handled satellite data-sets, as well as 
statisticians and climate modelers (Santer et al. 2008; see below). But this apparently made 
no difference to Christy, who simply repeated his earlier claims. 
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Each scientist that set out to disprove the conclusions of their work successfully adopted 
different means of theoretical exploration to show why using radiosonde data in the way 
that it was used, was seriously flawed (Santer, et al. 2008). Despite this discreditation, 
Christy would go on to testify in front of the United States Congress  not to offer a 
justification of the research in light of the comments that had been made about it, but to 
directly repeat the science that his peers had already negatively assessed. Their testimony was 
not informed by the best judgements of the entire scientific community, but rather their 
own, which had since been shown to be inadequate.  (Lloyd and Winsberg 2018)  
The details of this situation 
second criterion of the inductive risk account. He argues that it can be difficult to point out when 
vaguely characterised in this way. To add further to 
this, at 
for whatever reason did violate these conventional standards. 
However, these problems can be sidestepped if we choose to focus instead on 
communication standards, rather than research standards. This gives us a far more concrete picture 
of exactly the manner of standard being discussed, thus avoiding the issue of vagueness; there are 
universal and unambiguous laws governing the ways you are allowed to share your research if you 
wish for it to be considered science. communication standards are one of the ways 
that conventional standards are able to be enforced. It furthermore provide a means of avoiding a 
related problem discussed in the literature, e.g. by de Melo Martin and Intemann (2018) and 
Winsberg (2018)  
her dissent. Hence, rather than focusing on violations of conventional research standards, we might 
fare better by taking violations of conventional research communication standards into consideration 
instead. So, criterion 2 would read: 
 
 
21 
 
2*) The dissenting research that constitutes the objection violates established conventional 
communication standards.  
Entering standards of communication into consideration further strengthens the link, also 
invoked by the latter criteria of Biddle & Leuschner, to ideas of scientific community. Such 
standards are a requirement of objectivity in science as outlined by Longino (1990), so dissenting 
events like these may additionally be interpreted as actions that worked to diminish the objectivity of 
scientific practice. Therefore, it would be prudent to discuss scientific community in a way that 
might help us further understand that. 
This might best be done using an understanding of the scientific community as expressed by 
Kristin Rolin. She provides detail that would clarify the sort of doubts expressed by Winsberg, 
namely, in that we can understand conventional standards of research as a representation of shared 
epistemic responsibility. Pace 
claim when she provides sufficient evidence in its support or adopts a defence commitment with 
(2017).  There are two 
that of 
revise the [knowledge] claim whenever it is challenged, for 
what we have discussed so far. Note that the defence commitment is a communication standard, in 
addition to an epistemic principle. If it is the case, as I have said, that Biddle & Leuschner aimed in 
their latter criteria to reflect the importance of community standards in understanding detrimental 
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dissent, then characte
commitment makes a strong argument for the idea that they were acting with epistemic 
irresponsibility, in a way that violates the communication standards of science.  
Winsberg and Douglas, among others, are right to call attention to the ancillary residual 
there is some historical evidence we can appeal to in order to assess the nature of dissent. Though it 
becomes quickly apparent that merely identifying the motivation of a scientist is not enough to say 
whether or not she is producing qualitatively bad science, exploring features related to motivations 
proves a fruitful way into the discussion. 
research dissemination is enough to show that a scientist is violating the communication standards of 
science in a way that is indicative of epistemically detrimental dissent. The following is an outline of 
the framework that scientific research is to be understood for my communications account of 
epistemically detrimental dissent (CAEDD.) 
 I will introduce the account more fully in the following section. However, a clearer 
it would in fact hold up  as, of course, 
centres around the idea that these concepts are about certain actions taken towards 
particular gr
fruitful, rather than detrimental, dissent? The idea that good scientists will have other experts within 
their field as the main or intended audience of their research, is one that is disputed by de Melo 
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Martin and Intemann, who point out that using non-expert address is an option used by people who 
desire expert attention, but who are unable to get it due to the bottle-necking effect of orthodox 
research dissemination structures (2018, p.38-39). If people are trying to get their research looked at 
because they genuinely believe it to be superior to its widely accepted competitor, they will use other 
or additional means to guarantee people see it. So, the main audience does not have to be other 
scientists, because the current system of research dissemination is not viable for most heterodox 
research. If there was an ideal state, in which all research was able to be looked at and thoroughly 
assessed by the proper means, though, I believe it would then be right to say that the only proper 
audience for research would be the scientific community. A picture of how such an ideal system 
would operate may be worth exploring further.  
I
address epistemically detrimental dissent like that of our case study in Christy & Douglass. Recall 
that their research on radiosonde data was responded to extensively by the scientific community, and 
that the pair of them went to testify about their findings in Congress instead of defending their 
research in light of what their peers were saying, thus violating epistemic responsibility. While it can 
be legitimate to address non-expert audiences to garner attention for an idea, a researcher must bear 
the burden of epistemic responsibility when it comes to subsequent responses to a successfully 
disseminated hypothesis. that scientists must be held to if they are to 
testimony was representative of the fact that they intended to do neither, even though they presented 
themselves to Congress as experts of that very field. 
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5.0 The Communications Account of Epistemically Detrimental Dissent  
To properly introduce CAEDD, we must first describe the manner in which science 
functions as a communicative process. A scientific researcher is an individual who seeks to further 
understanding of a given topic by gathering information (data) through experiment or observation. 
She gathers this information, usually with a small group of her peers, in order to share it with the 
wider scientific community through mutually recognised avenues such as journals or academic 
conferences. 
The community, in turn, engages her work. This engagement is minimally done through the 
process of peer review, and then further when a scientist outside of her group decides to cite the 
research. The understanding of the wider scientific community can then grow because of this 
broader engagement. Errors can be overlooked by one group of researchers, but they would quickly 
catch the attention of another group that can write about these mistakes through the same mutually 
recognised avenues. accessible to all in that scientific community. This process repeats itself 
-span. 
First, responses must be given in light of critical comments made against it. That is to say that 
they must address the critical topics raised in the response, in the terms that the responder has made 
them  a manner of epistemic responsibility. This must be done whether or not the scientist believes 
those terms to be epistemically good ways of thinking about the phenomena; her response is indeed 
substantively the reasoning behind why her peers ought not to consider them epistemically good 
 
 
25 
 
either. Failure to respond in like terms would be a violation of the standards of communication of 
science. 
To be clear, I take non-adherence to communication standards to be indicative of 
epistemically detrimental dissent because science functions, by its nature, through the kind of 
communication engendered by epistemic responsibility. Therefore, anything that works to frustrate 
the proper communication of scientific research among researchers is working to frustrate the 
functioning of science itself.  
5.1 The Framework 
Earlier we described the way that science proceeds through research dissemination. To wit, 
the scientist qua scientist must go through this process. Being held to this process is what enables us 
to mark scientists as epistemic agents in the strong sense. This is what makes them accountable to 
them out from lobbyists, politicians and other laypeople. It can be necessary to discuss the actions of 
the latter kind of people to consider what mo
this too much when trying to assess what is going on in an epistemic sense. So, while the people 
around these issues that wield lots of power (such as U.S. president Donald Trump) can appear to be 
the most crucial to understanding issues of epistemically detrimental dissent, their status as non-
epistemic agents makes them, at the very least, fall outside of the purview of this particular project. 
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5.2 The Argument 
I have made the case for how normal science occurs. I mentioned that the nature of research 
dissemination and peer review/critique is repetitive in nature, occurring many times throughout the 
career-span of a researcher. This, combined with the non-private nature of scientific communication, 
is what makes me believe that the publication history of a given scientist can enable us to identify 
legitimate instances of epistemically detrimental dissent. While others that have touched on this 
topic, e.g. (de Melo Martín and Intemann 2018) have focused on the difficulty of assessing the 
contents of such publications, I instead place emphasis on the timing and location (avenues) of 
publication as most important for identifying EDD.  
The idea is to resolve one of the biggest issues with making the distinction between a possible 
case of EDD, and a scientific dispute that has fallen by the wayside for some less sinister reason. A 
(scientific/epistemic means) in addition to popular venues, such as magazines and newspapers. 
(  all other public forums such 
as academic conferences, and television appearances.) 
If she loses interest in the topic for some personal or professional reason, one would naturally 
expect the number of publications related to that topic to fall significantly, and even drop off, in 
both scientific and popular publications. A falling number of only popular publications is not 
Public engagement, though preferable for a number of social reasons, is not necessary for advancing 
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scientific knowledge. Though much of philosophy, notably (Douglas 2009), rightly discusses the 
in the previous framework and description of epistemic agents, is necessary for such advancement.  
An absence of scientific publications, combined with a high amount of popular publications, 
is a necessary criterion for EDD on my view. Ascertaining whether this has been reached requires 
case-by-case interrogation of the content and time factors that I have discussed. To illustrate, let us 
look back to the paradigm example given by our previous case study. Chrissy and Douglas did not 
present a total absence of scientific publications, as both had published in journals on the topic of 
climate change prior to this case example. But at the time of their testimony before U.S. Congress  
 their work had been the specific target of scientific 
publications responding to the evidence and reasoning given in their paper. The same paper, 
centered on a refuted result, that they then used as the basis of their testimony to Congress.  
Defenders of this view, e.g. (de Melo Martín and Intemann 2018), claim that a lack of 
shared evidentiary standards mean that different scientists can justifiably not see eye to eye on issues 
ieve 
the important benefits that are at stake when considering whether or not dissenting views are cases of 
value (or lack thereof) of assumptions and methodological processes that are regularly used during 
research. Challenging these compels people to defend them, and through trying to create this 
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defence, we make explicit each of the qualities that makes them worthy and legitimate, or not. 
Additionally, dissent prompts, or is accompanied by, alternate hypotheses in these instances, leading 
to epistemic diversity in the area. This leads to a more pronounced understanding, and therefore 
advancement, of the foundations of science. 
I characterise timelines like these as instances of epistemic silence because of the lack of 
scientific discourse in response to things that should be considered pressing scientific manners (such 
as varied papers showing glaring errors in the reasoning behind your work).  Such epistemic silences 
are suspicious when combined with generous activity in popular publication, where scientific 
publication is warranted. Epistemic silence stands in contrast with the behaviour of a scientist 
; in the interest of furthering understanding about a subject, 
a person in this position would either maintain total silence (with neither popular or scientific 
activity,) or total communication, expressing in both popular and scientific publications why the 
newest reasoning against his view is in fact misguided. In this case, total silence could have been 
maintained until Chrissy and Douglass had time to gather the reasoning or evidence that would 
allow them to advance to total communication, something that would have made their congressional 
testimony permissible. But as an unambiguous instance of epistemic irresponsibility, epistemic 
silence should be considered one of the key aspects of EDD. 
If I am right in making this characterisation, then it is hard to see how EDD can represent 
both a welcome injection of epistemic diversity and possible source of scientific progress, as well as 
something that has no obligation to engage the orthodox body of knowledge it would allegedly 
transform. W
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taken as normal in the phlogiston theory,) it is far more difficult to find old transformative theories 
that have come to be known as such, without engagement with the competing theories of its time. 
The worry of conflating legitimate dissent with EDD is a very important one, but it has brought a 
too-strong dose of cynicism to the demarcation effort. The result has been overlooking conflicting 
characteristics like these, that make the work of accurately describing EDD far easier.  
In this regard, the worries that have been appealed to in order to discourage demarcation 
attempts h  
Our current technologies afford us the ability to unambiguously track what scientists put out 
on the public record. I believe that taking advantage of this, by looking at the type and timing of 
both popular and scientific publications of scientists, is one of the key ways to understanding a 
significant portion of epistemically detrimental dissent. When these are improperly matched, it can 
be a useful warning signal for EDD. An individual whose scientific publications on a topic fall to 
nothing, while popular publications on the same remain high, would be deserving of closer scrutiny 
than scientists who maintain the inverse, or an otherwise equal balance. Furthermore, timing can 
also be tracked as a fruitful way of helping identify EDD, as in the case of epistemic silence, where 
both popular and scientific publications were seen, but in the wrong order. 
As epistemic agents, scientists must publish academic research, and an absence of scientific 
publication of a topic during a hotly debated scientific topic, shows the individual at hand is no 
longer willing to contribute to understanding this subject matter. On its own, this may be 
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insignificant. It is only through combining this with active popular publication on the same topic, 
that the incidence of EDD truly becomes apparent. 
Some may see the framework I have used as too much of an oversimplification. It is certainly 
the case, for 
whatever reason, and not go through the work of publishing a response to someone that has 
criticised your work, even if you have good reasons to disagree with the criticism. You do not owe 
epistemic responsibility to a field you are no longer interested in. This critique is spelled out further 
in (de Melo Martín and Intemann 2018, p.46-48). Attempting to claim that a certain work did not 
especially because the genuineness of these engagements are in themselves assessed by the epistemic 
standards that the different groups may not share. 
The idea that  can account for all instances of research 
public communication history into consideration, 
however. Recall that in our case study, Chrissy and Douglass testified about their research findings to 
congress despite the fact that they had never acknowledged or addressed the widespread criticism of 
it. Simply not sharing the same constitutive values as the orthodox researchers cannot legitimise non-
communication in an enterprise that relies on it. Their coming out to testify in front of Congress 
would indicate that they were at the time still interested in being (or appearing to be) experts in the 
fields of climate science, but their epistemic irresponsibility shows that they did not want anything to 
do with the science itself.  
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5.3 Relevant Available Science 
One of the key problems that is raised with attempts at demarcating EDD, is that the 
demarcation rests upon the dissenter sharing epistemic standards with his target. For instance, 
somebody may not agree with consensus regarding climate change because they do not believe that 
our current modell
climate is experiencing a warming trend. Such differences are merely a consequence of epistemic 
diversity. Epistemic diversity is valuable to the scientific endeavour for a number of reasons, see e.g. 
Longino 1990, and so, making (wrong) assertions about certain forms of dissent is a threat to this 
diversity, and hence, to its very essential benefits. 
This claim rests on the belief that all dissent is potentially transformative. Any scientific 
claim has the potential to change the beliefs and/or practices of other scientists. While this is true, we 
can see from (Brysse, et al. 2012) (Oreskes and Conway 2010) and (Nash 2018) that this is true, but 
not rightly so. These show that the transformative effect of dissenting research in climate science has 
at the very least been disproportional to the research put out on it, strongly suggesting that there was 
an influence of popular communication on their research practices. 
On the other hand, I believe that not all dissent should have the ability to transform. 
Relevant  
RAS. By this I mean that people attempting to criticise a particular theory, hypothesis, or school of 
thought, ought to be aware of the most rigorous evidence according to those who support it, as well 
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as the reasoning behind it. This is what would enable their critique to be novel, and so, rightly 
potentially transformative. Being aware and merely disagreeing with the RAS you are criticising can 
be a consequence of non-shared standards.  
However, that the RAS has been understood and well reasoned with, has been taken for 
granted somewhat. Indeed, the most relevant reasoning behind the strength of a theory would be its 
greatest downfall in the eyes of an opponent to that theory. 
The link between avoidance of RAS and EDD is not, however, immediate.  
A researcher can write dissent to a theory without engaging RAS if she is indeed ignorant or 
-to-date on the cutting 
edge research of an entire scientific field, and levelling claims of EDD towards dissent that is borne 
of this confusion is not what I intend. 
Meanwhile, as incidents like these occur, and the critiques and challenges to the heterodox 
publications go unanswered, external influences use the prominence of the dissent, and the 
appearance of dissidents as experts, to justify directing additional research efforts towards answering 
questions considered already well known in the scientific community  in other words, towards 
epistemic vacillation. This is how EDD and epistemic vacillation are inextricably linked. Groups or 
individuals that renounce engagement of scientific critique in favour of popular communication end 
up guiding the direction of science, but through outside, indirect means. 
The conclusion of this argument would seem to drive a wrench in the normal functioning of 
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applied to potentially detrimental dissent, then they must surely be applied to their counterparts. If 
researchers had to engage every frivolous critique or counter-critique of their original research, we 
would end up with something that looked very much like the epistemic vacillation we were initially 
seeking to avoid. 
In response to this, I would appeal to the epistemic superiority of the scientific enterprise as 
scientist, as epistemic agent, is to find empirically supported claims about nature. As such, they have 
adopted a method of communication between researchers that has to date allowed them to advance a 
great deal of knowledge. This does not mean that they are without issues of unwarranted 
assumptions or non-diverse value inclusivity, but rather that, as a matter of course, they will 
endeavour to overcome these obstacles, which means that vacillation should be of no concern 
reason, frivolous critique would be exposed as such, and of course, critiques of science that do indeed 
lead to improvement, would not be frivolous at all. 
 
6.0 Conclusion 
Epistemically detrimental dissent is one of the greatest threats to the ideal distribution of 
epistemic labour in modern science. The blueprint to stalling or disturbing research efforts in fields 
that threaten vested interests is being created in front of our eyes, and it is important that we 
understand what makes the differences between these, and the dissent that is so central to our 
 
 
34 
 
scientific method. There are concerns raised that existing efforts to do so have not been 
comprehensive  that they do not successfully describe paradigm examples of EDD, or indeed only 
describe a select number of cases that may be part of the relevant group. My attempt is certainly one 
such effort. Rather than considering this a negative, I believe it draws attention to the true 
heterogeneity of EDD. A true and thorough accounting of EDD may take a series of narrow, 
singular arguments, but it is a worthwhile endeavour that should be pursued further in the 
philosophy of science. 
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